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Consumer Perceptions of Online Transaction Security - A Cognitive Explanation of
the Origins of Perception
Easwar A. Nyshadham, Department of Aviation Business Administration, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University, nyshadhe@cts.db.erau.edu

In this research, we focus on consumers’ perceptions
of online risks. We suggest that the consumer risk
perceptions also arise from some well-known cognitive
biases that decision-makers (consumers) are typically
subject to. Taking an information processing view of
customer decision making, we provide a subset of
cognitive biases, which affect consumer judgments in
information acquisition, alternative valuation and learning
from evidence. Theoretical and limited experimental
evidence is provided.

“Many consumers visit the Travelocity site, but it takes
as many as five visits to generate a single booking, and
many people look but never book at all. Why? The
primary reason given for this hesitancy is the fear of
credit card theft or fraud. Even among those persons who
made a reservation, a study showed that some three out of
five agreed with the statement that sending a credit card
over the Internet was "just plain stupid." The fact is that
the chances of fraud or theft with respect to credit card
transactions on the Internet are far less than for
transactions using cash registers, fax machines, the mails,
and the telephone. Yet, nagging doubt persists, and
consumer perceptions are of course reality(emphasis
ours). We will continue to work with Mastercard and
other leaders to develop standards for secure electronic
transactions that will alleviate these fears. In the
meantime, the government can help by letting the public
know that electronic transactions are safe."

Keywords: Electronic Commerce, Internet, security,
privacy, B2C commerce, online risks, heuristics,
cognitive biases

Section 1: Risks in B2C Online Ecommerce
and Research Questions
There is a widely held perception among consumers
that informational flows associated with online
transactions are much less secure than the flows in
traditional transactions. Three issues of managerial
importance emerge from such a perception. The first
quote summarizes the first issue: consumers subject to
such a perception may either not transact online at all or
may only partially consummate the transaction on the
Internet i.e., consumers may “look” but not “book”
online. The second issue arises from the second quote: to
the extent that such a perception exists, do consumers
have to be provided additional compensation or
“compelling reasons” for engaging in online transactions?
The third issue follows from the above two – if the
security concerns are merely a perceptual issue and not
based on objective evidence, then why can’t the industry
merely communicate to the consumers that their
exaggerated perceptions are incorrect?

by CEO of Travelocity, April 1998, Testimony before
House Committee
“While many consumers are visiting online retailers, few
are buying. The study argues that online retailers need
to improve convenience and value for consumers and
assist them in overcoming their fears around security.
Retailers must also provide reluctant consumers with
compelling reasons for accepting the Internet as a new
way to shop(emphasis ours). Some of these reasons
might include the use of consumer assurance brands and
enhanced levels of convenience, customization, selection,
service and pricing.”
From the Executive Summary of a study conducted by
Boston Consulting Group, for Shop.Org, March 1999

Abstract

In this research, we examine a descriptive theory of
decision making (e.g., Prospect Theory) and identify
heuristics/biases which can explain the questions raised
above. The three research questions are stated as follows:

An important impediment to the success of business to
consumer ecommerce is the consumer perception
regarding the riskiness of the online channel. A widely
held perception among consumers is that financial
transactions on the Internet are inherently more risky and
not secure. Interestingly enough, most security experts
would view Internet transaction as, in fact, more secure
than traditional transactions. The persistence of this
misperception is therefore, quite surprising.

R1: Do cognitive biases affect consumer perception of
online transaction risk?
R2: Do cognitive biases affect the “compensation”
demanded by consumers for transacting online?
R3: Do cognitive biases affect how consumers process
objective risk information?
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processing of information. However, to the extent that
heuristics are “rules of thumb”, they are not always
accurate. Application of heuristics, therefore, can lead to
systematic errors in judgment.

Section 2: Security Perceptions
Numerous surveys (Anonymous 1997a, 1997b, 1998a,
1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1999a, 1999b) have been conducted
to understand consumer perceptions of online
transactions. Two primary “sources of friction” for online
transactions that emerge from a summary of the studies
are i) security concerns and ii) privacy concerns. Rose et.
al., (1999) conducted a comprehensive review of
technological impediments to business to consumer
electronic commerce and suggest that security is the most
important issue facing business to consumer ecommerce.
In this research, we view security as the primary
determinant of consumer trust and hence focus on this
issue.

The research questions and the relevant biases
organized by stage of human information processing are
summarized in Table 1.

a) Information Acquisition Stage:
When making decisions under uncertainty, people
“code” objective probabilities of events presented to them
into subjective probabilities or “decision weights” prior to
decision making. The function used to convert true
probabilities to decision weights is S-shaped and flat at
lower end, as shown in Figure1. (Tversky and Kahneman
1992, Camerer and Ho 1994, Tversky and Fox 1995, Wu
and Gonzalez 1996, Gonzalez and Wu 1999). The
implication of a consumer using such a function is that,
individuals attach the same subjective probability to all
events below a certain probability threshold.

The consumer perception that Internet transactions are
insecure is quite surprising. Numerous technology experts
refute the claim that transacting on the Internet by sending
credit card information or other important personal
information is any less secure than transacting otherwise
(See, for example, the quote by the CEO of Travelocity).
It is likely that encrypted information flows are the least
significant source of security risks. Second, the most
significant risks for security may arise from the internal
security policies and procedures adopted by firms (Cohen,
1996). Segev et. al. (1998) suggest that the most sever
security threat may in fact be the “emancipated corporate
computer user”.

Figure 1: Normative probabilities versus
Decision Weights
Perceived
Probability/
Decision
Weight

To summarize, numerous independent surveys have
found that, consumer concerns about security and privacy
far outweigh their other concerns such as usability of the
web site, download delays, search problems, interface
limitations etc. From a consumer perspective, it is likely
that security is primarily a perceptual issue – i.e.,
consumers systematically misjudge the risks in online
transactions. Consumer perceptions that online
transactions are insecure, we submit, arise from cognitive
heuristics they employ in understanding and evaluating
risks. The heuristics or “rules of thumb” employed by
consumers lead to systematic misperceptions or cognitive
biases.

1.00

Threshold

0.00

Probability

1.00

Represents the true probability of an event taking place.
A rational consumer would provide the same decision
weight to the event as the true probability.

The curved line represents the subjective probability
that a decision maker attaches to a true probability. For
example, small and extremely small probabilities are
perceived to be the same by a decision-maker.

Section 3: Security perceptions and
Cognitive Biases
Normative theories of decision making, such as the
Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEU theory) describe
how a decision makers ought to behave. In contrast,
descriptive theories, such as the Prospect Theory (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992), focus on how consumers behave
rather than how they ought to behave. This stream of
literature (Kahneman & Tversky 1983, Slovic &
Lichtenstein 1982) argues that humans are subject to
biases, which are perceptual in origin. When faced with a
decision problem, humans employ heuristics to simplify

An Illustration of Coding Bias: Assume that a consumer
initially views an unencrypted web site as having a small
risk p=.001(say) of being hacked. Assume the vendor
upgrades security through an appropriate mechanism and
lowers the risk to one in a quadrillion (i.e., p=1/1015). If
the threshold of probability for the consumer is (say) .001,
then she consumer would perceive the same risk for even
after the security upgrade.
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Table 1. Summary of Cognitive Origins of security
concerns
Research Questions/
Support

Stage of Information
processing

Phenomenon / Source of Bias

R1: Do cognitive biases
affect consumer
perception of online
transaction risk?

Information Acquisition:
Understanding of probabilities
of risky events

Support: Literature

Information Acquisition:
Understanding of probabilities
of risky events

R2: Do cognitive biases
affect the “compensation”
demanded by consumers
for transacting online?

Evaluation of Alternatives:
Valuing a gamble

Consumers fail to distinguish between
very low probabilities and low
probabilities and behave as if they are
nearly the same./ Decision weights
used in place of true probabilities
Concrete and vivid examples of past
risky events, rather than frequency,
are used to judge the probability of
occurrence of events in the future/
Availability and Concreteness
heuristics
In comparing online versus traditional
offerings, if consumers view the
online channel as riskier, the
perceived value of the online offering
will be much lower to the consumer
than the rational theory would
suggest/ Loss Aversion Phenomenon.
Statistical data and expert judgments
will not be used to correct
misperceptions./ Neglect of consensus
information in attribution and the base
rate neglect biases.

Support: Literature
R3: Do cognitive biases
affect how consumers
process objective risk
information?

Attribution of Causes and
Effects:
Formation of a mental model
of risks and causal attributions

Support: Literature and
an Experiment

Implication for
Consumer Decision
Making
Probability of online
security risk is
overestimated.

Probability of online
security risk is
overestimated.

The value of a good
sold online is
underestimated.

Online transactions will
continue to be perceived
as risky, regardless of
how sound and
statistically valid
evidence to the contrary
is.

perceive them as if they were nearly the same. The second
bias (availability) suggests that concrete illustrations of
phenomenon, rather than frequency of the phenomenon,
influence probability judgment. The overall impact of
these biases is that, a human decision maker would
systematically overestimate the security risks in online
transactions. Hence, consumers would perceive the
Internet as more risky than it actually is.

Kahneman and Tversky (1983) describe a second
cognitive bias, which also serves to exaggerate risk
perception in consumers. They state that when people
assess the probability of an event, the ease with which
salient instances or occurrences, which are readily
“available” for recall determine the value assessed. The
judgmental heuristic used here is called availability.
However, availability in memory is affected by how
vividly prior instances of the event were described to a
subject. Slovic et.al., (1983) argue that concrete
illustrations of a phenomenon make them more available,
so that they are easily recalled from memory by human
decision-makers and used as proxies for estimation of
likelihood of an event..

b) Valuing Alternatives
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1983), “losses
loom larger than gains”. It may be argued that people use
the traditional, offline transaction channels as a frame of
reference when evaluating online transactions. To the
extent that online channels are considered to be riskier,
consumers may perceive a potential loss in transacting
online. Using traditional utility theory, one would assume
that a consumer should be offered a “risk premium” to
make her indifferent between using the traditional channel
versus the online channel. Under prospect theory,
however, the disutility of an online transaction, being a
perceived loss, is higher than rational theory would
suggest. Ceteris paribus, the risk premium or the
“compensation” demanded by a consumer under Prospect
Theory will be larger than the risk premium computed
under rational theories.

Illustration of Availability and Concreteness: In the
past, media has focused a lot of attention on hackers
(Slatalla and Quittner 1995, Stoll 1989.) Further, the
breaking of the 40-key encryption code used by Netscape
browser in earlier versions, as well as the 56-bit DES
encryption code are also public knowledge and are
discussed in textbooks dealing with electronic commerce
(Kalakota and Whinston 1996). To the extent that a
customer can recall the security incidents vividly, she will
overstate the probability of hacking or a general security
incident.
To summarize, the two cognitive phenomena described
above explain why the probability of a risky event, such
as hacking, may be exaggerated by most consumers. The
first bias suggests that consumers do not distinguish
between low and extremely low probability events and

Assume that a consumer perceives the offline channel
as risk free. However, on the online channel, a consumer
may perceive that a small probability p exists of a loss of
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risk-averse utility function which is standard in utility
theory. A potential loss of $M has a disutility
corresponding to the intercept on y-axis of D1. The
prospect theory utility function is centered around the
current frame (price in an offline channel) and is much
steeper for losses than gains. The corresponding disutility
is D2 which is higher than D1, the disutility under
standard theory. The corresponding expected disutility
under prospect theory will also be higher (probability of
loss, p, is not shown in the figure.).

$M, say due to credit card fraud. This creates an added
disutility to the consumer. Therefore, to make a consumer
indifferent between buying online versus offline, a
“compensation” or risk premium has to be offered to the
consumer. Given a utility function for the consumer and
specific values for probability p and potential loss $M, a
risk premium can be computed.
The magnitude of risk premium would be higher under
Prospect Theory. Prospect theory would suggest that
consumers would now use a local utility function,
centered on the frame of reference, which has a much
steeper slope for perceived losses than perceived gains.
Correspondingly, the disutility of buying online is higher
and therefore, to compensate for this higher disutility, a
larger “compensation” or risk premium needs to be
offered.

Illustration of Loss Aversion: To make this argument
concrete, assume that a widget is being sold offline for
Poffline channel of $10. When the same widget is sold online,
due to the added risk, assume that a standard
“compensation” of E(-$M,p)=$-1 has to be offered to
make a consumer indifferent to buying the product online
versus offline. Under prospect theory, the expected
disutility has to be larger than $1, say $2. The price of
widget, under loss aversion is, therefore, $8. The impact
of loss aversion is that goods sold online will be
undervalued, ceteris paribus.

This argument is presented in Figure 2. Consumer
utility is plotted on the y-axis and the dollar amounts
corresponding to a loss of $M (hence -$M) is plotted on
x-axis. The POffline Channel represents the frame of reference.
The consumer is assumed to have a globally concave,
Figure 2. Disutility under Loss Aversion

c) Attribution Biases and Consumer
Learning

Globally risk-averse utility function of a consumer under
rational theory

To the extent that industry experts believe that online
transactions are not as insecure, it would seem that
communicating the lower risks is a solution to the
problem. If consumers are provided with objective
information on risks, will they discard their original
perceptions and use the objective information in their
decision making?

Local Loss aversion function around frame of reference

Utility

-M

POffline Channel
In an experiment designed to answer this question, 50
undergraduate subjects enrolled in a business school were
informed that in a typical Internet transaction, five parties
are usually involved and each one contributes to the
riskiness of the transaction. The parties are: buyer, seller,
the insecure channel, a financial intermediary such as a
credit card company and the Internet Service Provider
(ISP). Subjects were initially asked to provide a
subjective estimate of risks arising out of each party
involved in an online transaction, using a constant sum
100 point scale. Following this, they were provided with
hypothetical base rates i.e., seemingly objective
probabilities of how likely each party would have been
responsible for a security incident.

$

D1

D2

D1: Disutility of
a potential loss of
M with a
traditional utility
function

Next, a vignette was provided to the students in which,
a hypothetical consumer makes an online purchase and
finds out three months later, that there was suspicious
activity on his credit card. The vignette was carefully
structured to be completely uninformative. Subjects were
then asked to provide a third set of risk estimates to

D2: Disutility of
a potential loss of
M under
Prospect Theory
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indicate the probability that each party was responsible. A
copy of the instrument is available from the author.

Section 5: Summary
Current research on electronic commerce security is
focused on the technical aspects such as vulnerabilities,
risks, mechanisms and security frameworks etc.
Increasing evidence suggests that consumers perceive the
online channel as more risky than traditional channels.
Such perceptions may be best explained as arising out of
well known cognitive biases that consumers are subject
to.

The mean perceived risks for each party, aggregated
across subjects, are plotted on the y-axis in Figure.4. The
first set of columns refers to the subjective mean risks
provided by subjects at the beginning of the experiment.
The second set of columns displays the researcherprovided base rates i.e., seemingly objective probabilities
based on a fictitious study. Subjects participating in the
experiment did not know this during the study, but were
debriefed later on. The third set of columns refer to the
probabilities assigned to various parties by students, after
they are exposed to the base rates and the vignette.

Cognitive biases literature provides a theoretical basis
for suggesting that i) security risks will be exaggerated by
consumers, ii) the “compensation” sought by consumers
may be more than what traditional theory would suggest,
ceteris paribus, and iii) such perceptions may be difficult
to change. The implied hypotheses may be tested in an
empirical and/or experimental setting. In this research, we
provide experimental evidence to answer the third
research question which suggests that consumers are
likely to ignore seemingly objective evidence and
therefore, it would be difficult to communicate online
transaction risks.

Since the vignette itself is uninformative, subjects will
have to make judgments of risks based on prior
information. If subjects persisted with their original
perceptions, then the distribution of risks across parties in
perceived and judged cases should be nearly the same.
The hypothesis is stated formally as follows:
H1: Judged probabilities (third set of columns) come
from the same distribution as the perceived probabilities
(first set of columns)

Future research may focus on further clarifying and
extending the role of cognitive biases in security
perceptions. In this research, theoretical support was
provided for the first two research questions and
experimental evidence was provided for the third research
question. Experimental tests of the first two research
questions will also be an important step in understanding
the role of the biases.

A Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test for equality of two
sample distributions was rejected at 0.05 level (D*=2.6),
suggesting that original perceptions were modified during
the experiment. A second K-S Test was conducted to test
if the treatment had an effect, i.e., judged probabilities
had the same distribution as the base rates. The hypothesis
is stated as follows:
H2: Judged probabilities (third set of columns) come
from the same distribution as the base rates (second set of
columns).
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